The game in which acts of participants don't have an adequate description in terms of Boolean logic and classical theory of probabilities is considered. The model of the game interaction is constructed on the basis of a non-distributive orthocomplemented lattice. Mixed strategies of the participants are calculated by the use of probability amplitudes according to the rules of quantum mechanics. A scheme of quantization of the payoff function is proposed and an algorithm for the search of Nash equilibrium is given. It is shown that differently from the classical case in the quantum situation a discrete set of equilibrium is possible.
Introduction
It often occurs that mathematical structures discovered when solving some class of problems find their natural application in totally different areas. The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics operating with such notions as "observable", "state", "probability amplitude" is not an exception to this rule. The goal of the present paper is to show that the language of quantum mechanics, initially applied to the description of the microworld, is adequate for the description of some macroscopic systems and situations where Planck's constant plays no role. It is natural to look for applications of the formalism of quantum mechanics in those situations when one has interactions with the element of indeterminacy. So in recent papers [5, 6, 7] the connection of quantum mechanics with decision problems in the conditions of the indeterminacy is discussed. In [3] as well as more recently [4] it was shown that the quantum mechanical formalism can be applied to description of macroscopical systems when the distributive property for random events is broken. In the physics of the microworld non-distributivity has an objective status and must be present in principle. For macroscopic systems the non-distributivity of random events expresses some specific case of the observer's "ignorance".
In the present paper a quantum mechanical formalism is applied to the analysis of a conflict interaction, the mathematical model for which is an antagonistic game of two persons. The game is based on a generalisation of examples of the macroscopical automata simulating the behaviour of some quantum systems considered earlier in [1, 2] .
A special feature of the game considered is that the players acts go in contradiction with the usual logic. The consequence is breaking of the classical probability interpretation of the mixed strategy: the sum of the probabilities for alternate outcomes may be larger than one. The cause of breaking of the basic property of the probability is in the non-distributivity of the logic. The partners relations are such that the disjunction "or", conjunction "and" and the operation of negation do not form a Boolean algebra but an orthocomplemented non-distributive lattice. However this ortholattice happens to be just that which describes some properties of a quantum system with spin one half. This leads to new "quantum" rules for the calculations of the average profit and new representation of the mixed strategy, the role of which is played by the "wave function" -the normalised vector in a finite dimensional Hilbert space.
Calculations of probabilities are made according to the standard rules of quantum mechanics. Differently from the examples of quantum games considered in [8, 9, 10] where the "quantum" nature of the game was conditioned by the microparticles or quantum computers based on them, in our case we deal with a macroscopic game, the quantum nature of which has nothing to do with microparticles. This gives the hope that our example is one of many analogous situations in biology, economics etc where the formalism of quantum mechanics can be used.
. Where were you Bob?
The game "Wise Alice" formulated in our paper is a modification of the well known game when each of the participants names one of some previously considered objects.
In the case if the results differ, one of the players wins from the other some agreed sum of money. The participants of our game A and B, call them Alice and Bob have a quadratic box in which a ball is located. Bob puts his ball in one of the corners of the box but doesn't tell his partner which corner. Alice must guess in which corner Bob has put his ball. The rules of the game are such that Alice can ask Bob questions supposing the two-valued answer: "yes" or "no". It is supposed that Bob is honest and always tells the truth. In the case of a "yes" answer Alice is satisfied, in the opposite case she asks Bob to pay her some compensation. However, differently from other such games [11] the rules of this game (see Fig. 1 ) have one specific feature: Bob has the possibility to move the ball to any of the adjacent vertices of the square after Alice asks her question. This additional condition decisively changes the behaviour of Bob, making him to become active under the influence of Alice's questions. Due to the fact that negative answers are not profitable for him he, in all possible cases, moves his ball to the convenient adjacent vertex. to that of Alice: (−h ik ). The main problem of game theory is to find so-called points of equilibrium or saddle points -game situations, optimal for all players at once. The strategies forming the equilibrium situation are optimal in the sense that they provide to each participant the maximum of what he/she can get independently of the acts of the other partner. More or less rational behaviour is possible only if there are points of equilibrium defined by the structure of the payoff matrix. A simple criterion for the existence of the equilibrium points is known: the payoff matrix must have the element maximal in its column and at the same time minimal in its row. It is easy to see that our game does not have such equilibrium points. Non-existence of the saddle point follows from the strict inequality valid for our game
So there are no stable strategies to follow for Bob and Alice in each separate turn of the game. In spite of the absence of a rational choice at each turn of the game, when the game is repeated many times some optimal lines of behaviour can be found.
To find them one must, following von Neumann [12] , look for the so called mixed generalisation of the game. In this generalised game the choice is made between mixed strategies i.e. probability distributions of usual (they are called differently from mixed "pure" strategies) strategies. As the criterion for the choice of optimal mixed strategies one takes the mathematical expectation value of the payoff which shows how much one can win on average by repeating the game many times. The optimal mixed strategies for Alice and Bob are defined as such probability distributions on the sets of pure strategies x 0 = (x ) that for all distributions of x, y the von Neumann-Nash inequalities are valid:
where H A , H B -payoff functions of Alice and Bob are the expectation values of their wins
h jk x j y k
The combination of strategies, satisfying the von Neumann-Nash inequalities, is called the situation of equilibrium in Nash's sense. The equilibrium is convenient for each player, deviation from it can only make the profit smaller. In equilibrium situations the strategy of each player is optimal against the strategy of his (her) partner. Existence of equilibrium in mixed strategies is based on the main theorem of matrix games theory (von Neumann's theorem). To find them one must solve the pair of dual problems of linear programming and it is made easily. The only question is: do optimal strategies correctly describe the behaviour of Bob and Alice in their game with a ball?
3 . The classical "Foolish Alice"
In classical matrix game theory the optimal strategies of the players are totally defined by their interests. All other characteristics of the participants of the game are totally ignored. To go from this oversimplification of von Neumann's game theory one must look for other concepts of equilibrium, for example due to von Stackelberg [11] or to study influence of the psychological relation on the outcomes of games [13] . Our attention will be concentrated not on the psychological but on the logical aspect of the conflict interaction of players. Before discussing the logical nuances pay attention to the fact that the payoff matrix in In order to see clearly the difference between the two games and to discriminate "wise Alice" from the "foolish" one we introduce notations making the difference evident.
Encode the strategies of Alice and Bob by vectors, consisting of zeros and ones:
so that the component equal to one means the applied pure strategy. Then it is evident that
and the profit of Alice in one turn of any of the games considered is
So, in the separate turn the "wise" Alice is not different from the "foolish" one. The difference occurs in the behaviour when the game is repeated many times. The source of the difference is in the different method of calculation of the average payoff.
Consider it explicitly. At first let us take the classical case of interaction. In the case of the "foolish" Alice the initial strategies of Bob are not correlated with the strategies of his partner, so
and averaging of the payoff gives the well known classical expression
where x j , y k are frequencies of the corresponding pure strategies. For our payoff matrix one obtains the expression of the payoff function for Alice as
Then one must, using the linear programming, find the saddle points for natural constrains
In our case there is only one equilibrium point and the mixed strategies of Alice and Bob are found as:
is the price or the value of the game i.e. the average profit of Alice in the equilibrium situation. So the optimal frequency of Bob's being in this or that corner of the building is inversely proportional to the sum of money which he must he give to his girl friend. The optimal strategy of Alice is more sophisticated: she must not be very greedy and more frequently come to the places where her friend will not pay too much to her. 
In the case of our payoff matrix this expression has the form (ap 24 + dp
where p l jk , q l jk -conditional probabilities of the choice of the corner l from the given pair of opposite corners {j, k}. From this it follows that the conditional average payoff for Alice will be E α 13 ∩β 13 H A = ap Alice to see Bob and he must not pay for presents. Easy calculations show that
These formulas will be of use for us when we discuss the behaviour of Bob moving the ball in the game "Wise Alice".
. Different logics -different behaviour
Let us discuss now the behaviour of players in the game "Wise Alice". First notice that this game gives the simplest model of measurement (defining the place of the object). Alice wants to know where is Bob located but she makes Bob active by her questions, "preparing" him in a definite "state". She gets exact information, not in all cases, but only when the negative answer is obtained. Alice makes proposals but the logic of her propositions must be somehow different from the classical scheme.
More explicitly, let α k is the proposition of Alice that Bob's ball is located on vertex number k. One can consider this value as the predicate: the function defined on the set S B of initial strategies of Bob taking logical values 0 or 1. For our box with a ball Fig. 1 it is easy to see that the values of propositions of Alice are distributed as follows:
Defining disjunction as usual as
one obtains a "slight" breaking of the classical logic: the disjunction of any pair of different propositions occurs to be identically true:
Remember that for the classical "foolish" Alice one has
Differences with classical logic occur also for negation. Instead of the classical relations ¬α j = 1 − α j one has the equalities:
Really, every time when Alice learns that the Bob's ball is not located at the questioned vertex of the square she understands that it is located at the opposite vertice.
Notice that the law of double negation ¬(¬α j ) = α j as well as the law of the excluded third α j ∨ (¬α j ) = 1 are valid. One must define the conjunction. It can be introduced by the standard formula
It is easy to see that this is the only way of defining the conjunction if De Morgan's laws of duality are valid:
Defining thus all logical operations let us check other differences with classical Boolean logic. First notice that in spite of the fact that any pair of different propositions of Alice is in complementarity:
not all of them are orthocomplemented-mutually opposite. Only pairs of propositions with the same "parity" {α 1 ; α 3 } {α 2 ; α 4 } are orthocomplemented. Second, one has a breaking of the distributivity law. So, for any triple of different j, k, l one has the
Really, the left side of the inequality is equal to α l ,while the right side is zero. So the logic of Alice occurs to be a non-distributive orthocomplemented lattice [14, 15] . Same concerns the logic of Bob. His state reduced by the question of Alice is described by the analogous system of predicates β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 defined on the set of strategies of Alice and taking the value 1 for those questions on which he can answer affirmatively. In from the classical ones one can think that the payoff of Alice in the separate turn of the game still is given by the same expression as before
The main difficulties arise when one goes to the repeated game and when one tries to calculate the average payoff. If one tries to give to the average value of predicates the probabilistic interpretation:
one immediately comes to the contradiction: the sum of probabilities of pair-wise disjoint (due to our definition of the conjunction) outcomes is larger than unity
This follows from the additivity of the average and (8), leading to the following identities
Hope for the validity of additivity for pairs of mutually neglecting events also occurs to be in vain. Due to the property that the left-handed side of easily checked inequalities
sometimes takes the value equal to 2, the main property of probability is broken even for orthocomplemented elements. The probability properties are also broken for the disjunction (see Hasse diagram Fig. 3 ). If one considers all outcomes equally possible, then the probability of the always true event, i.e. disjunction of any of two events occurs to be one half! So a classical probabilistic description of the behaviour of the players in the repeated game is impossible in principle. The solution for the situation arising is given by the ideas of quantum mechanics.
. To averages through quantization
Following A.A.Grib and R.R.Zapatrin [1] we pay attention to the fact that the ortholattice of the logic of interaction of partners of the "Wise Alice" is isomorphic to the ortholattice of invariant subspaces of the Hilbert space of the quantum system with spin 1 2 and observables of the type of S x S θ . In Fig. 4 two pairs of mutually orthogonal direct lines {a1; a3}, {a2; a4} are shown. One of these pairs makes diagonal the operator S x , the other S θ . If one takes as representations of logical conjunction and
We saw that in one "experiment" neither Alice nor Bob have a stable strategy. However if the game is repeated many times one can ask about optimal frequencies of the corresponding pure strategies. Due to the non-distributivity of the logic ,as we saw previously, it is impossible to define on the sets S A and S B of pure strategies a probabilistic measure. The main problem is calculation of an adequate procedure of averaging. Describe all these ways up to the unitary equivalence. We do this for the predicates of Alice. The same can be done for Bob. In H A take an arbitrary one-dimensional subspace and put its orth-projector into correspondence to the predicate α 1 : the projector denote as α 1 . To the predicate α 3 put into correspondence the orthogonal complementary projector α 3 . Then the following evident and for us desirable relations are valid:
It is clear that the choice of these operators is unique up to unitary equivalence.
Take an arbitrary one-dimensional subspace different from the eigenspaces of the projector α 1 and put it into correspondence to the predicate of some orth-projector α 2 . To the variable α 4 put the projector 1 − α 2 . In the result one obtains one more
Projectors from different resolutions do not commute one with another. However there is a simple connection between them: the second of direct resolutions is obtained from the first by rotation through an angle different from multiples of 90 o . In other words there exists a unitary operator u such that
It is clear that this unitary operator defines the class of unitary equivalent realisations of our non-distributive ortholattice, negation is represented by going to the complementary projector. Notice that differently from the predicative description due to rules (7) leading to unpleasant inequalities (8) the operator representation of the non-distributive lattice due to (9,10) is "friendly" to orthocomplementarity:
Doing the same for the Bob's lattice one comes to the observables β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 and analogous to u a unitary operator v giving the connections between "even" and "odd" variables. The next step of our scheme is the space of game situations. The quantum analog of the classical space of game situations becomes the tensor prod-
This space is necessary for introducing the main observable: the payoff for Alice. To write this observable following quantum mechanics take the classical expression (3) of the payoff function of Alice
h jk α j β k and write there the corresponding projectors. In the result one obtains the selfconjugate operator in H A ⊗ H B , the observable of the payoff for Alice:
h jk α j ⊗ β k Let Alice and Bob repeat their game with a ball many times and let us describe theirbehaviour by normalised vectors ϕ ∈ H A , ψ ∈ H B . The element s = ϕ ⊗ ψ expressing their interaction during the game is a normalised vector in H A ⊗ H B .
Taking it as the characteristic of the state of the game calculate the average in this state E ϕ⊗ψ H A according to the standard rules of quantum mechanics
so that after easy transformations one gets for the average payoff for the given types of behaviour of the players:
Putting into this formula the elements of our payoff matrix and using the notations
E ϕ⊗ψ H A = ap 1 q 3 + cp 3 q 1 + bp 2 q 4 + dp 4 q 2
It is useful to compare this expression with the classical average obtained earlier for the "foolish" Alice:
There is some resemblance but there is also a serious difference. One could ask, why it is impossible to recalculate the quantum average differently by normalising the frequencies to one not only for each diagonal separately but for two diagonals as it is made in the classical case? But the fact is that like in case of measuring non-commuting operators of spin projections Alice knows about her interaction with Bob when she asks him and receives the answer. This interaction is different when questions on different diagonals are asked because different positions of the ball are immovable for these cases. So relative to different interactions (different context) different events are defined leading to different probabilistic spaces as it is true for measuring spin projections. One can use the metaphor that if in one case Alice is throwing the coin and is interested if "up" or "down" will arise, in the other case the interaction with Alice will change the coin in such a way as if a new coin is thrown, on one side of which a big "up" and the small "down" of the previous coin are drawn.
On the other side of the new coin the opposite situation occurs. So the new coin is made asymmetric following the structure of the payoff matrix. In homogeneity of events in the quantum case makes impossible the renormalisation of frequencies and leads to new results for averages.
. Probability amplitudes instead of probabilities
The main difference in the given formulas is in the sense of variables. If x j , x k are probabilities, the p j , p k cannot be because they contradict the main laws of the probability theory. Really, taking into account that the projectors α j and β k with indices of the same parity commute and form a resolution of unity, one obtains after standard calculations the following identities.
So, differently from classical probability theory, for each family of pairwise disjoint events { α j }, { β k } one obtains the relations
The sense of the values p j , p k is obtained by using the standard quantum rule. Let for example the behaviour of Alice be described by the normalized vector ϕ ∈ H A , and let ξ E ϕ⊗ψ H A = (ap 1 q 3 + cp 3 q 1 ) + (bp 2 q 4 + dp 4 q 2 )
with formula (4) one obtains an interesting result: the "wise" Alice gets a larger payoff than that which is obtained by her "foolish" copy:
Notice, however, that to have this one must have the situation where the squares of moduli of the probability amplitudes in "quantum" Nash equilibrium are equal to the conditional probabilities obtained by applying the apparatus of the classical game theory. However there is no foundation for such an equality. In fact, if the equilibrium point of the classical game is searched on the set of nonnegative numbers with constrains
then in the quantum game case for the squares of moduli of the probability amplitudes besides the explicit linear relations
there are implicit relations due to unitary dependence (12) of projection operators with even and odd indices. The difference between the two pictures is due to the fact that in the quantum situation the formula of full probability (15) is broken: the average payoff to Alice is equal to the sum of conditional probabilities and not to their mixture: P 13 = P 24 = 1. This again demonstrates that it is impossible to find a quantum equilibrium point by use of only formula (13) 
where θ A is the angle on which eigenbasis of the operator α 2 is rotated relative to the eigenbasis of the operator α 1 . Calculating the commutator of these matrices one obtains:
Analogous commutation relations are obtained for Bob's operators. Non-commutativity of the operators of the logic representation expresses evident, without any mathematics, the dependence of the results of the game on the order of acts. So Bob's state is different depending on the order: "1", then "2" or "2", then "1", in which he received Alice's questions . So in the quantum model one takes into account not only the interests of the players represented in the payoff matrix but in some sense their personal features on which depends the level of realisation of interests.
8 . In search of the quantum equilibrium.
The definition of the Nash equilibrium for the quantum case is not much different from the classical case (1) and can be written as
It is convenient to find the equilibrium points in the coordinate form. To do this let us fix in the space of strategies of Alice H A eigenbases {ξ
2 } corresponding to two projectors α 1 , α 2 and let us do the same for Bob, taking bases {η
The angles between the largest eigenvectors denote as θ A and θ B . Then one can write in the quantum payoff function E H A (ϕ, ψ) = ap 1 q 3 + cp 3 q 1 + bp 2 q 4 + dp 4 q 2 the squares of moduli of the amplitudes p j , p k as 
It is easy to see that intersections of curves of reaction give points of Nash equilib- ; and the conditional average payoffs (5,6) for each diagonal are:
The price of the classical game is obtained by multiplication of these expressions on the probabilities of the corresponding conditions given in section (4) . Terms of the quantum payoff, associated with these conditional averages E ϕ⊗ψ H A in case of the first equilibrium point are ap 1 q 3 + cp 3 q 1 = 1.927 ; bp 2 q 4 + dp 4 q 2 = 0.525
For the second equilibrium point one has: ap 1 q 3 + cp 3 q 1 = 0.915 ; bp 2 q 4 + dp 4 q 2 = 1.048.
2.
A unique equilibrium is observed for example in the case when all nonzero payoffs are equal and are equal to one and for equal angles θ A = 45 0 , θ B = 45 0 . The equilibrium point is located in the upper right vertex of the square (see Fig. 6 ):
The curve of Bob's reaction is shown on the Fig. 6 as continuous while the analogous curve of Alice is discontinuous when Bob is using the strategy corresponding to the angle β = 90 0 . To make it more explicit the discontinuity is shown by drawing the Absence of equilibrium in this case as it is seen from the Fig. 8 is due to the discontinuity of the functions of reaction which is impossible in the classical case. We met this phenomenon in the first example when two equilibrium points were obtained. This last example shows the importance of the realisation of a non-distributive lattice.
In the language of the game theory one can understand it as follows: having the same interests the players can form their behaviour qualitatively in different ways. So the mathematician can give to the client, for example to Alice, strategic recommendations: how she can organise the style of her behaviour to make the profit larger for the same payoff conditions. For this, however, he must know the choice of the representation of Bob's logic.
Concluding remarks
The construction and analysis of our models show that the main difference between classical and quantum points of view on observable phenomena is expressed in the However, one who knows it will not be surprised by the attempts to explain some features of macrophenomena by the specific way of calculating the averages. The exact answer to our question implies an analysis of the logical structure of the investigated phenomena. If the logic adequately representing the experience is non-distributive then classical procedures of calculating the averages lead, as we saw, to contradictions and one must use another apparatus. If the obtained lattice happens to be the lattice of subspaces, then the answer is given by the Gleason's theorem [17] saying that probability measures on the lattice of projectors have strictly definite form. So if one is solving the problem of averaging of the payoff function, taking into account logical conditions of the players, then going to quantization in some cases is predestined.
One can only be surprised that the structure of the classical expression of the payoff function is such as if it were specially invented to put there instead of the two-valued function the operators. This leads to the general scheme of quantization of games. In any case if one considers not antagonistic but bimatrix game when the interests of the players are not strictly antagonistic, the scheme of quantization will be the same. This problem however as well as games of many persons goes beyond the contents of this paper. The problem of non-uniqueness of orthocomplements in the lattices is also goes beyond our paper.It exists even in case of our lattice: for negations one can take correspondence between "even" and "odd" questions. In the general case this problem, touching the theory of representations of internal symmetries of non-classical logics can lead also to some natural application of the formalism of quantum mechanics. The important point in our scheme is taking care in the difference between the logic and its operator representation. One sees that there exists a continuum of classes of unitary equivalent representations, parameterised by the angles of the type θ A , θ B . Each of these representations can be described by the commutation relations for the corresponding non-commuting operators. In the players logic these pairs of projectors correspond to mutually complementary questions, neither of which is the negation of the other. As it was shown previously non-commutativity is connected with the dynamics of the game -the order in which questions are posited.
Considering the quantum game we had the problem of existence of equilibrium. As was seen from the examples their existence or absence is connected not only with the structure of the payoff matrix but also with the representation of the lattice of properties. Absence of equilibrium is also connected with the representation of the behaviour of the players by pure states-by vectors in Hilbert spaces, when the game situation is represented by some resolved element of their tensor product. The notion of equilibrium can be enlarged as it is done in the classical game theory taking mixed enlargement on the basis of the density matrices. Here we didn't consider entangled states. As was shown [2] in the case of entangled states one must deal with more complex non-distributive lattices. The search of equilibrium among entangled nonfactorisable states can lead to success in proving the existence of equilibrium in the general case of quantum games.
